Changing State And Federal Payment Policies For Medicaid Disproportionate-Share Hospitals
How states are responding to changes in the federal rules that govern their ability to support hospitals that serve the poor.
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ABSTRACT: The Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) program has been the subject of considerable policy debate throughout the 1990s, prompting Congress to revise the program three times since 1991. Using Medicaid administrative data and information obtained from twelve state case studies, we examined how the study states dealt with the federal reforms. We found a variety of state responses, ranging from not spending their full DSH allotments to seeking new, "DSH-like" federal money to help support safety-net providers.
T he M ed i cai d di sp r op or t iona t e -s ha r e hospital (DSH) program has sparked intense federal/state debate. The federal government has criticized some states for "abusing" the program by using it to diminish their fiscal responsibilities at the expense of the federal government. The states counter that the program is essential to maintaining the health care safety net for vulnerable populations. And many hospitals (especially public ones) argue that DSH payments are critical to their survival.
Federal law requires state Medicaid programs to "take into account the situation of hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients with special needs" when determining payment rates for inpatient hospital care. This requirement is known as the Medicaid DSH payment adjustment. DSH expenditures have soared in the 1990s; by 1996 they accounted for one out of every eleven dollars spent on Medicaid.
Congress has reformed the Medicaid DSH program three times since 1991. To comply with these reforms, many states have made sweeping changes to their DSH programs. In this paper we examine some state responses to the federal DSH provisions. We also discuss the potential effects of the DSH provisions in the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. We rely on Medicaid administrative data as well as information obtained from the Assessing the New Federalism (ANF) case-study states. 1 
Controlling Spending Growth
Although the DSH mandate was enacted in the early 1980s, states were slow to implement DSH programs. To encourage them, Congress passed several DSH provisions in the mid-1980s. A key provision (included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, OBRA, of 1986) allowed states to pay hospitals rendering high volumes of care to low-income patients rates above those paid by Medicare and exceeding the so-called Medicare upper payment limit. 2 This exception fed the rapid growth of Medicaid DSH expenditures that began in the early 1990s.
Another key to DSH expenditure growth was the development of provider tax and donation programs in the late 1980s, under which states taxed or received "donations" from health care providers. Using the revenue generated, states would issue a Medicaid payment (for example, a DSH payment), generally to the same providers that had been taxed or had made a donation. Since state Medicaid expenditures are eligible for partial reimbursement from the federal government, the state then would seek federal matching dollars.
Provider tax and donation programs had enormous financial advantages for a state. Each dollar raised from a tax or donation program could generate one to four dollars in federal Medicaid matching funds. To earn the match, however, the state had to spend the tax or donation revenues, because the federal Medicaid match is based on expenditures, not revenues. The Medicaid DSH payment provided the mechanism to spend these revenues. The DSH payment was singled out because it was not subject to the Medicare upper payment limit. Thus, states could make virtually unlimited DSH payments and, in the process, earn federal matching dollars.
Once states discovered that they could leverage additional federal dollars, many established provider tax and donation programs in the early 1990s. DSH payments rose from $1.3 billion in 1990 to $17.7 billion in 1992. DSH spending accounted for 13 percent of total Medicaid spending in 1992, up from only 1.9 percent in 1990. By 1996, DSH payments had moderated at $15.1 billion.
n The first DSH reform: 1991. Congress first responded to the rapid rise in Medicaid DSH payments by passing the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 (P.L. 101-234). Key provisions included (1) essentially banning provider donations; (2) limiting provider taxes so that provider tax revenues could not exceed 25 percent of the state's share of Medicaid expenditures; (3) imposing provider tax criteria so that taxes were "broad based" and providers were not "held harmless"; and (4) capping state DSH payments at roughly 1992 levels. 3 The 1991 law curtailed DSH payment growth and also forced many states to restructure DSH financing. Providers could no longer be promised DSH payments that at least equaled their taxes or donations. The new law required donations to be "bona fide" and taxes to be "real" assessments. As a result, many states had trouble establishing tax and donation programs that complied with the 1991 law.
Because of these difficulties, states turned to intergovernmental transfer (IGT) programs as the primary revenue source for their DSH programs. Under these programs, states transferred funds from public institutions such as state psychiatric facilities, university hospitals, and county or metropolitan hospitals to the state Medicaid agency. The state then would make DSH payments back to these hospitals, collecting federal Medicaid matching dollars in the process.
n The second DSH reform: 1993. Although the 1991 law leveled DSH spending growth, federal policymakers remained concerned about the appropriateness of DSH payments in certain circumstances. A particular worry was that some states were making DSH payments to providers that were not large Medicaid providers, while other states were making DSH payments that more than compensated providers for the unreimbursed costs they incurred in caring for Medicaid and indigent patients. Moreover, some providers were receiving DSH payments in excess of the revenue they received for rendering care to Medicaid patients. In short, federal policymakers believed that DSH payments were not fully being used for their intended purpose of helping safety-net providers but rather to help general state financing. Indeed, a 1993 survey of thirty-nine state DSH programs found that one-third of DSH funds were being retained by states and not being paid to DSH hospitals. 4 Congress responded in OBRA 1993 with provisions such as the following: (1) Only those hospitals that had a Medicaid use rate of at least 1 percent could receive DSH payments. (2) Total DSH payments to a single hospital could not exceed the unreimbursed costs of providing inpatient care to Medicaid and uninsured patients. These limits typically took effect in 1994 for public and 1995 for private hospitals.
How The States Responded
To investigate how states dealt with the 1991 DSH law and OBRA 1993, we examined Medicaid expenditure data from Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Form 64, which is submitted by all states. 6 We also relied on information obtained from the ANF case studies of thirteen states. We asked several respondents (including state Medicaid officials, hospital executives, and hospital association representatives) about their state's DSH program.
Although the ANF states were not selected to be representative of states' DSH programs, they account for a large share of national DSH expenditures (about 60 percent in 1996). They also represent a cross-section of Medicaid DSH programs. The thirteen states varied greatly in the size of their programs (Exhibit 1).
States also varied in how they financed their DSH programs. Most of the states relied exclusively on IGTs for state financing, but final year of the more liberal hospital-specific caps for public facilities that expired after 1995. e Highlights states that increased provider reimbursements for hospitals (and in some instances other providers) where there was room under the Medicare upper payment limit as the 1991 and 1993 DSH provisions took hold. f Before the 1991 law states were able to more easily direct DSH funds to hospitals that donated funds or paid targeted provider taxes. After 1991 some states modeled their state Medicaid plans so that this relationship was maintained even with the requirement s for broad-based taxes and bona fide donations. Other states, while shifting to intergovernmental transfers as the primary funding mechanism, allowed DSH funds to flow to facilities that did not pay into the system. g For two states (Massachusetts and New York) the state-specific DSH caps legislated in the 1991 law became binding, and the states sought federal regulatory relief to develop DSH-like programs. h Three states were able to convince either Congress or the Health Care Financing Administration to release some restrictions imposed by the OBRA legislation to maintain historical levels of DSH funding. purpose? State politics also played a role, as did the general health care environment (for example, the competitiveness of the market, growth in Medicaid managed care, and the numbers of uninsured persons).
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n Switch to intergovernmental transfers. An almost immediate response to the 1991 law was that most states fundamentally changed how they financed their DSH share. As mentioned earlier, many states had trouble establishing provider tax and donation programs that met the 1991 criteria. Many responded by switching to IGTs, which shifted funds from public institutions (such as psychiatric facilities and university and public hospitals) to the state Medicaid agency. IGTs generally were made by state-or locally owned public hospitals. Most of our study states used IGTs to support their DSH programs. 8 The remaining states made little or no adjustment to their financing structure, since their existing mechanisms were not invalidated (or claimed as such) by the 1991 law. New York's and Massachusetts's DSH payments (paid out through their uncompensated care pools) have been consistently supported by provider tax programs. 9 The tax programs remained similar in structure after the 1991 law took effect. California did not switch its DSH financing, because the state's program had been supported by IGTs since it began in 1991.
n Payments to mental health institutions. An early response to OBRA 1993 was that several states began making or expanding DSH payments to institutions for mental disease (IMDs), for two reasons. First, IMDs are generally public institutions owned by state or local governments. The link between the financing (with IGTs) and DSH payment thus could be tight, thereby keeping DSH funds in the public domain. Second, including both acute care and mental hospitals made it easier for states to fully spend their DSH allotments while staying within the OBRA 1993 facility-specific caps.
Increasing DSH payments to IMDs was a temporary shift for some states, more permanent for others. Alabama paid 64 percent of its total DSH payments to IMDs in 1994 (no IMD DSH payment was reported in 1993) and then reduced this amount to 1 percent in 1995 (Exhibit 3). In other states, such as Florida, a more fundamental shift occurred, with the share of DSH funds going to IMDs increasing every year. Still other states (Mississippi, California, and Colorado) made little or no use of these payments.
The use of IMDs for DSH funds has been an especially contentious area between the federal government and the states. By making large Medicaid DSH payments to mental hospitals, states are to some degree federalizing their funding. Because of statutory limits, Medicaid has not been a large payer of inpatient mental health services; instead, states have been. 10 Thus, when states started to make large DSH payments to IMDs, federal dollars effectively supplanted state dollars. DSH payments to IMDs were greatly curtailed in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act; we return to this point later.
n Reduced DSH spending. While some states are spending their full DSH allotment as allowed under the 1991 law, some either cannot or have chosen not to. Nationally, states spent 77 percent of the total DSH allotment in 1996, down from 92 percent in 1994 (Exhibit 4). 11 Among our study states, Colorado, Michigan, and Minnesota have shown the greatest declines. The case studies revealed a number of reasons why these states were not spending their full allotments. Colorado spent $122 million on DSH in 1996, less than half of its $320 million allotment. According to respondents, a key reason was that Colorado policymakers have intentionally sought to keep the state's DSH program small so that if the federal government ever cut the DSH program they would not have to face hospitals' expectations of maintaining DSH funding. Another reason officials cited was that if Colorado spent its full DSH allotment it would be in violation of state spending limits, as codified in the state's constitution. Colorado hospitals have tried unsuccessfully to get the state to increase DSH spending. In 1997 hospitals developed a strategy that would allow the state to spend more of its DSH allotment while keeping within the state spending limits. The legislature, however, was not interested.
Michigan has greatly reduced its DSH spending, for different reasons. Between 1994 and 1996 Michigan's DSH spending fell from $617 million to $347 million; in 1996 the state spent only half of its allotment. These large decreases are explained by the changes Michigan made to its DSH program to comply with OBRA 1993. Before 1993 Michigan's DSH program channeled the bulk of its DSH payments through one hospital-the University of Michigan (UM) Hospital. As documented by the U.S. General Accounting Office, UM Hospital was really used as a pass-through of federal DSH funds, and most of the federal dollars were kept by the state.
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When the hospital-specific caps took effect, DSH payments to UM Hospital were cut from $570 million in 1994 to $42 million in 1996. In their stead, Michigan began to make large payments to state mental hospitals; between 1994 and 1996 the state's DSH payments to IMDs went from $2 million to $240 million.
Although the IMD DSH payments made up some of the funds that had previously been paid to UM Hospital, Michigan wanted to maintain federal Medicaid dollars coming to the state at a level comparable to the pre-OBRA 1993 period. To do this, the state began to make a series of Medicaid supplemental payments (which totaled more than $600 million in 1996) over and above regular Medicaid reimbursement to a range of publicly owned health care providers. Thus, while Michigan's formal DSH spending has declined, the state has significantly increased Medicaid supplemental payments to a select group of providers.
Minnesota has a relatively small DSH program that, since its inception, has been financed with state general funds. In recent years Minnesota's DSH spending has declined; by 1996 the state was spending about 60 percent of its $64 million allotment. The decrease n Enhanced provider payments. Another response to the 1991 and OBRA 1993 DSH provisions was that some states began to make supplemental Medicaid payments to hospitals as well as to other providers. Generally, these payments are made to selected providers (typically public facilities) and are paid over and above regular Medicaid service reimbursement. As such, enhanced payments do not count against a state's DSH allotment or an individual hospital's DSH cap. Instead, they are reported as a regular service expenditure.
California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin are among the states that have used this strategy. California has made supplemental payments for nearly a decade to hospitals that contract with the state to serve Medicaid clients. California's supplemental payment program operates along the same lines as its DSH program: The state receives funds transferred from hospitals that contract to serve Medicaid clients. 13 The funds are then put into a single pool. When determining Medicaid hospital payments during its annual rate negotiations, the state redistributes pool funds to selected hospitals as increased payments. The state then receives federal matching funds for the additional payments, which are not counted against California's DSH allotment. Although the supplemental payment program has been in place since the late 1980s, the state has recently increased the amount of supplemental payments. Some of this is the result of a general state effort to get more money to Medicaid hospitals in the wake of OBRA 1993 caps.
Among our states, Michigan made the most extensive use of supplemental payments. The state has turned to making targeted Medicaid supplemental payments as a way to maintain its level of federal Medicaid funds. Specifically, beginning in 1995 (as the OBRA caps were taking effect) Michigan began to issue large Medicaid supplemental payments to public facilities. The state's share for these payments came from IGTs paid by the institutions receiving the supplemental payments (such as community mental health boards and schools that deliver Medicaid-funded special education services). In 1996 Michigan made more than $600 million in targeted supplemental payments (reported as a Medicaid service expenditure, not a DSH expenditure), up from about $390 million in 1994. Thus, Michigan has replaced a large share of its DSH expenditures with supplemental Medicaid payments while maintaining the level of federal Medicaid dollars coming to the state.
n Maintained link between funding and DSH. Over the years many states have received revenue in the form of provider taxes or donations from a targeted group of providers, which was later returned to the very same providers in the form of DSH payments. This practice of targeted payment typically continued (and sometimes became more refined) when IGTs were developed: Public facilities provide state financing of DSH payments, and payments generally were made to the transferring facilities. However, when the OBRA caps became effective, states' ability to channel DSH payments to selected providers was greatly limited. States now had to decide how tightly they were going to preserve the link between DSH funding and DSH payment. As part of this decision, states had to determine whether they were going to allow some of the DSH dollars to go to providers that were unable to make IGTs (such as private hospitals).
Our study states adopted a range of policies on this matter. As discussed earlier, Colorado and Michigan decided for different reasons to forgo spending their full DSH allotments but kept the strong tie between IGT funding and DSH payout by largely restricting payments to public facilities.
The OBRA caps posed significant issues for Alabama, which had had an IGT-financed DSH program. Since the early 1990s Alabama had become highly reliant on federal DSH funds: In 1995 federal DSH dollars accounted for at least 40 percent of the state's $2 billion Medicaid program, whereas state general fund dollars accounted for only 11 percent.
As the hospital-specific caps took hold, in 1995 Alabama devel-
oped a network of eight prepaid health plans (PHPs), fully capitating Medicaid inpatient care spending across the state.
14 PHPs are new, for-profit entities owned and operated by hospitals in each of eight service areas across the state. When Alabama sets the PHP cap rates, DSH payments are included. PHPs are then responsible for negotiating reimbursement rates for each hospital. By folding DSH payments into the PHP cap rate, the state has effectively avoided the hospital-specific cap. At the same time, it has successfully kept the link between its DSH funding source and payout very tight.
California has also consistently spent its full DSH allotment. Unlike Alabama, however, the state has allowed some decoupling of the funding and payout of its DSH program. Since the state started its DSH program in 1991, California counties, through IGTs, have supplied the state's share of DSH payments. Although California has always made DSH payments to private hospitals, the bulk of federal DSH funds went to county hospitals. However, the share of federal funds going to county hospitals has declined over time: Between 1991 and 1995 federal DSH funds paid to county hospitals dropped from $649 million to $461 million, while the amount paid to private hospitals more than doubled, from $162 million to $365 million.
According to respondents, the competitiveness of California's health care market is the primary reason for the DSH shift. As managed care for privately insured patients has increased and private hospital payment rates have declined, Medicaid reimbursement rates increasingly have been viewed by California hospitals as attractive, especially with the Medicaid DSH add-on. The OBRA 1993 caps also have affected the distribution of federal DSH dollars among hospitals, although to a lesser extent. 15 The continued shift of federal DSH dollars to private hospitals has become a highly contentious issue in California. Private hospitals argue that because they serve Medicaid patients, they are entitled to DSH funds. Counties assert that federal DSH dollars should be retargeted and flow instead to providers that serve a disproportionate share of uninsured indigent persons (that is, to county hospitals). The DSH issue in California has temporarily subsided since the passage of the BBA of 1997, which included a special state exemption from the OBRA 1993 hospital-specific cap: For two years California is allowed to pay hospitals 175 percent of unreimbursed costs rather than 100 percent as allowed under OBRA 1993.
n Additional DSH-like federal funds. Three states (California, New York, and Massachusetts) obtained additional DSH-like federal funds (via Medicaid Section 1115 waivers) to help support safety-net hospitals. Although these DSH-like funds are targeted to safety-net hospitals, they are not reported as DSH expenditures.
Thus, these waivers have effectively introduced a new type of federal support to safety-net providers.
In 1995 the federal government granted Los Angeles County an 1115 waiver, which allocated additional federal money to the county health care system, on the condition that the system be restructured to have more of an emphasis on ambulatory care. The county projects that it will receive approximately $900 million in federal funds over the five-year waiver period. Some of the waiver funds also are being used to expand the county's ambulatory care capacity and to assist county hospitals in becoming more competitive.
Likewise, New York, as part of its new 1115 Partnership Plan waiver, was granted additional federal funds to help safety-net hospitals make the transition to mandatory Medicaid managed care. New York plans to move approximately two million Medicaid enrollees from fee-for-service to managed care over the five-year demonstration period. Under New York's Community Health Care Conversion Demonstration Project (CHCCDP), $1.2 billion in federal funds will be made available to safety-net hospitals. These funds are not counted against New York's $3 billion DSH allotment nor against a hospital's DSH cap. Instead, funds paid out through the CHCCDP represent new federal "DSH-like" dollars that are going to the state.
In recent years Massachusetts has been struggling to support its uncompensated care pool, which has operated as part of the state's hospital rate-setting system since 1985. Payments made from the pool are claimed as Medicaid DSH expenditures. The pool, which had been funded by a tax on hospitals' private-payer charges, was designed to distribute the burden of hospital uncompensated care and to eliminate hospitals' incentives to underserve the uninsured.
Several problems developed with the pool. A key one was that the amount of money in the pool, frozen since 1990, became increasingly inadequate as the number of uninsured persons grew. However, the 1991 DSH law limited the amount by which Massachusetts could increase pool payments. Since pool payments are the state's DSH payments and Massachusetts is a low-DSH state, it could increase payments only at the same rate as that at which its total Medicaid expenditures increased. This limit, along with other problems, raised serious questions about the integrity of the pool program as well as about the state's ability to support safety-net providers.
"For the Medicaid program, DSH was Congress's prime budget target as it looked for ways to cut federal spending."
As part of its 1115 waiver program, Massachusetts will reduce pool payments to two large Boston hospitals that had received the bulk of DSH payments made from the pool. Instead of DSH payments, these two hospitals will establish capitated managed care plans for previously uninsured persons who are being extended Medicaid coverage as part of an eligibility expansion included in the waiver. The new plans created by the two hospitals would be paid an enhanced capitation rate, making up for the hospital's loss of DSH or pool payments. The enhanced rates are paid outside the pool and not counted against the state's DSH allotment. The waiver has allowed Massachusetts to issue more dollars to safety-net providers and to bypass the state's DSH allotment.
n Federal legislative/regulatory relief. A few states obtained federal legislative or regulatory relief from the 1991 and 1993 laws. California and Alabama were particularly noteworthy in this regard.
Along with the additional federal dollars granted to Los Angeles County, California was given a special exemption to the BBA's hospital-specific cap. Specifically, the BBA increased the hospitalspecific cap on DSH payments so that California is allowed to pay hospitals 175 percent of unreimbursed costs rather than 100 percent as set out in OBRA 1993. This exemption is valid until October 1999.
As described above, in 1995 Alabama established a statewide network of Medicaid PHPs. Initially, HCFA was concerned that the hospital-specific DSH caps were being violated, but the state claimed that the DSH payment rules do not apply to managed care organizations such as the PHPs. After considerable negotiations, HCFA awarded the state a two-year waiver-specifically a 1915(b) waiver-in 1997, allowing the state to mandate enrollment of Medicaid recipients into the PHPs. What will happen at the end of the waiver period is unclear.
DSH Provisions In The 1997 Balanced Budget Act
The DSH program will continue to change. The 1997 BBA included several DSH provisions, including the following. 16 For all states, the DSH allotments in the BBA represent a reduction over allotments allowed under previous law. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated federal DSH spending reductions from the BBA provisions at $10.4 billion over 1998-2002. 18 Indeed, for the Medicaid program, DSH was Congress's prime budget target as it looked for ways to cut federal spending.
In a recent simulation analysis we assessed how the BBA's DSH provisions are likely to affect states. 19 One set of results, which simulated reductions in federal DSH spending from 1998 to 2002 likely to result from the BBA relative to actual 1995 DSH spending, suggested an 11 percent reduction in federal DSH spending nationally. 20 The estimated impact also varied greatly from state to state. Among ANF study states, the estimated cuts were large for some states (such as Alabama, California, Massachusetts, and Texas) but relatively small for others (Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin).
Another important Medicaid item in the BBA was a special provision for New York State, which would have allowed the state to continue getting federal Medicaid matching dollars for certain health care provider taxes. President Bill Clinton, however, used his new line-item veto authority and struck down the provision, estimated to represent $1.5 billion in Medicaid funds to the state. The veto provoked considerable ire among New York State policymakers. 21 At issue was whether some of New York's provider tax programs violated the health care provider tax criteria set out in the 1991 DSH law. The federal government charged that some of New York's tax programs-one of which supports the state's charity care pool-did not comply with the 1991 legislation and declared that federal matching funds should not be paid. The New York veto has important implications for several other states currently negotiating with the federal government about the permissibility of provider tax programs. Moreover, the dispute raises the highly important matter of how states can finance their share of Medicaid costs. As of this writing, the Clinton administration has reinstated up to $1 billion of the $1.5 billion in question. When announcing the policy change, though, federal officials stated that they want to end the use of impermissible taxes as soon as possible and suggested that Congress may have to revisit the provider tax matter in the future. 22 O nl y t w o o f t he s t a t es that we studied (Minnesota and Wisconsin) did not make any fundamental changes to their DSH programs following the changes to the laws in 1991 and 1993. In these states DSH is largely financed like any other Medicaid service and is paid to providers to help cover the hospitals' unreimbursed costs of caring for Medicaid and other low-income patients.
NEW 133 FEDERALISM
Most of our states, however, did make changes to their DSH programs in response to federal policy revisions. These changes raise important questions about the purpose and integrity of the DSH program, as well as its future direction. For example, several study states are now making sizable DSH payments to mental hospitals, which are not typically large Medicaid providers and are not the intended beneficiary of DSH funds. A few study states have gone outside the boundaries of the DSH program and have started issuing targeted Medicaid supplemental payments to providers, including hospitals. Indeed, in Michigan supplemental payments have replaced a large share of the state's DSH program. The fact that these supplemental payments are funded primarily with IGTs, and paid to a variety of providers, calls into question the direction in which the state's overall Medicaid financing is heading.
Still other states have started to receive additional federal funds (to which we refer as DSH-like funds) to help shore up their safetynet providers. California, New York, and Massachusetts have all received large amounts of federal dollars for this purpose through the Medicaid Section 1115 waiver process. These new funds are counted not as DSH expenditures but as general Medicaid expenditures. Still other states are now folding DSH payments into global capitation rates for managed care plans, with the notion that DSH monies will "trickle down" to hospitals. Once included in the capitation rates, DSH as a distinct expenditure item is no longer reported. In sum, among our states, what constitutes a DSH expenditure is becoming increasingly more difficult to define and identify.
With the passage of the BBA, the DSH program will go through more changes in the near future. How the New York tax dispute is ultimately resolved, for example, likely will affect the future financing of DSH and of the whole Medicaid program. More immediately, the reduction in federal DSH payments will affect states in 1998. To the extent that DSH payments are being paid to hospitals, the BBA cutbacks represent a decline in Medicaid revenue going to safetynet providers. The reductions come at a time when safety-net providers are already feeling fiscal stress from changes in the overall health care market.
To the extent that federal DSH dollars are being retained by states and used to fund other state functions, the BBA cutbacks represent a decline in state revenues. Although states are enjoying the benefits of a strong U.S. economy, all state budget sectors including Medicaid will feel the loss of federal DSH dollars when a fiscal downturn hits.
How states will handle the DSH reductions is unclear. State policymakers will need to make some key decisions in the near future. For
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HOSPITAL PAYMENT example, states may opt to offset the loss of federal DSH dollars with state dollars. Alternatively, they may opt to let hospitals or county governments absorb the loss in revenue. Because more than thirtyfive million Americans lack insurance, though, the need to support safety-net providers is profound. As such, the federal DSH reductions will pose new challenges to states as they look for ways to finance health care services for their low-income populations.
